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ficient to exclude the confession, but that the weight to be given
thereto was for the jury. It was also held that under Schneider v.
People 41 it was proper to admit a joint confession which included
statements regarding similar offenses, as they were restricted by
instruction as evidence only of plan or design.
In the last case to be mentioned, M. McRae v. People,
4 " it
was held that where an irreconcilable conflict in the evidence was
presented it was the sole province of the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. This was a case of manslaughter while
driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol where the blood
alcohol analysis result was very high, and the only testimony as
to what the defendant had had to drink was "one and a half bottles
of 3.2 beer." The instructions as given by the trial court were
found to be without error and the conviction was affirmed with
one Judge dissenting.
In conclusion the writer would like to cite one more legislative
amendment, 40-14-2, '53 C.R.S. relating to obtaining goods under
false pretenses has been amended so that the dividing line between
a felony and misdemeanor is now $50.00 instead of $20.00. 43
TAXATION
By KEITH ANDERSON of the Dcnver Bar
DECISIONS
Only two cases dealing with this subject were before the Colo-
rado Supreme Court during the past year. One has application
only to a special class of taxpayers, but the other is of interest to
all property owners.
In Cooper Motors, Inc. v. Board of Jackson County Commis-
sioners, et al.,1 the plaintiff's attorneys asked the court to overrule
City and County of Denver v. Hover Motors, Inc.2 On an agreed
statement of facts, the trial court was presented with the issue
whether automobiles, upon which the specific ownership tax had
been paid, were subject to ad valorem taxes in those situations
where they form a part of a dealer's stock of merchandise. The
trial court, following the rule of law laid down in the Hover ca~e,
held that they were. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the lower court, overruling its holding in the Hover case. With
commendable frankness the court recognized its prior error in
construction of the applicable statute and constitutional provision.
The other case, Weidenhaft v. County Commissioners of El
Paso County, et al.,3 was an attack upon the validity of the state-
wide reappraisal program as applied to real property. The plain-
"118 Colo. 543, 199 P. (2d) 873 (1948).
'Vol. 7, C.B.A. Ad. Sh. No. 13, pg. 460; 286 P. (2d) 618.
41 S.B. 124, approved April 15, 1955.
'279 P. 2d 685, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
2 121 Colo. 439, 217 P. 2d 863.
3 283 P. 2d 164, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
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tiff, an owner of real property situated in El Paso County, brought
an action against the County Commissioners of said county to
recover the entire 1952 taxes levied upon his property. Since the
allegations made by the plaintiff included charges that the State
Tax Commission was unlawfully usurping the function of the
county assessor and that the statute (137-6-12 1953 C.R.S.) under
which it was acting was unconstitutional, the Attorney General
was permitted to intervene with the result that the Tax Commis-
sion, the individual members thereof, and the Attorney General
became parties defendant.
The majority opinion considered that plaintiffs were actually
advancing two theories, the first was that the statute under which
the State Tax Commission was acting was unconstitutional and
invalid, and the second was that the proceedings conducted pur-
suant thereto were irregular and illegal. On the second issue, the
court expressed the view that the plaintiffs had failed to pursue
their administrative remedies and that the case might be dis-
posed of on this issue alone. However, in view of the insistence
on the part of the plaintiffs' counsel that his entire case was based
upon the invalidity of the law, the court chose to decide the case
upon that issue. In so doing, the court held, with one dissent, that
there could be no present question as to the constitutionality of
the statute; that the statute was sufficiently broad to justify the
Commission in the adoption and application of reasonable standards
essential to bring about a more accurate, equitable and equal orig-
inal assessment; and that the Tax Commission's action in issuing
a pricing manual and other data and forms which assessors were
directed to use, but which were designed only for aid and assistance
of assessors and as standards by which they might more accurately
appraise property, was not a usurpation of assessors' functions.
LEGISLATION:
The legislature adopted a number of changes in the statutes
relating to taxation, which are probably of more continuing inter-
est than these cases.
S. B. 180 amends Subsection 14 of 138-1-12 C.R.S. 1953 by
permitting nonresidents to deduct contributions to Colorado chari-
ties in amounts equal to 15% of the income derived from sources
within Colorado, in the case of nonresident individuals, and 5%
of such net income, in the case of nonresident corporations. This
remedied a serious defect in prior law, which permitted deduction
only if ordinarily and necessarily incurred in connection with the
production of Colorado income. Naturally this greatly inhibited
nonresidents from making gifts to Colorado charities.
H. B. 202 continues the 20% credit against the state income
tax which has been in effect for several years to the calendar year
1955 or a fiscal year beginning in 1954 and 1955.
H. B. 459 Subsection (3) of 138-1-39 of C.R.S. 1953 relating
to the period of limitation for refunds of income taxes.
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H.B. 182 effects a substantial revision of the income tax laws
relating to corporate distributions, liquidations and reorganiza-
tions, so as to bring them generally in line with the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.
H. B. 232 amends the Colorado inheritance tax law so that it
is in conformity with the 1954 Revenue Code with respect to the
credit against the federal estate tax for the inheritance tax paid.
It also requires the filing of a copy of the Federal estate tax return
with the Inheritance Tax Commissioner in every estate where such
a return was filed.
Several other statutes were passed relating to the general
property tax but in general they effected only procedural changes.
PROPERTY LAW
By WILLIAM B. PAYNTER, of the Colorado Bar
(1) BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-USED CAR LOTS AND HOUSE TRAILERS
Cases which deal with building restrictions are Taylor v.
Melton, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1, p. 23 and Pagel v. Gisi,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 478. Both involved the question
of the effect of actual notice of building restrictions contained in
an original deed but omitted in subsequent deeds.
In Taylor v. Melton, supra, plaintiffs alleged in substance,
that one Fairley who was the owner of a parcel of land, platted
and subdivided same and a map thereof was filed February 4, 1941,
in the office of the County Clerk and Recorder; that Fairley sold a
portion of the tract to Nesbitts, the deed to which was dated
March 20, 1941, and thereafter recorded and which deed provided
that neither the grantees nor their successors and assigns would
construct a residence on the land of a cost less than $2,500; the
grantor covenanting that he would not build or permit to be built
upon any of the land standing in his name in the particular sub-
division, any structure other than a residence of construction value
of not less than $2,500; the above restrictions being a covenant
running with the land and binding upon the grantor, his success-
ors and assigns forever.
It was further alleged that plaintiffs were the owners of cer-
tain lots in said Fairley Addition and defendants the owners of
Lot Three thereof; that plaintiffs and defendants respectively
acquired their titles to said lots or parcels of land with notice and
knowledge of the restrictions set forth in the deed to the Nesbitts
and notwithstanding said restrictions, the defendants in February,
1952, planned and commenced and intended to complete a struc-
ture to be utilized as a used car lot, in violation of said restrictions.
The trial judge inspected the premises and found thereon a
one room small building used as an office, a number of cars parked
on the lot and the same was being used as a used and new auto-
mobile sales lot and that in addition thereto defendants had built
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